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Abstract :  Approximately 20% of the 675 equity mutual funds analyzed in this paper invest
in derivatives.  We compare the return distributions of equity mutual funds that invest in
derivatives to those that do not.  We also analyze the use of derivatives to affect
intertemporal changes in fund risk.  Equity mutual funds that invest in derivatives have
similar risk and similar net return performance in those that do not.  Change in fund risk is
negatively related to past performance, but derivatives allow funds to dampen these
changes.  We interpret these results as consistent with the hypothesis that managers are
slow to respond to unexpected cash flows, and inconsistent with gaming of incentive
compensation systems.1. Introduction
Derivative securities generate profits that are functions of changes in the price of
underlying assets. Why do investment managers use derivatives? Theoretical work has
advocated derivatives as a useful tool that allows investment managers to utilize
information better, manage risk, and reduce transaction costs [Scholes (1981) and Stoll
and Whaley (1985)]. In contrast, recent popular press commonly portrays derivatives as
speculative, high-risk investments [see, for example, McGough (1995a, 1995b)]. Public
concern has been strong enough to prompt the Securities and Exchange Commission to
reevaluate risk disclosure requirements for mutual funds [Taylor and Calian (1995)] and
to provoke possible regulatory initiatives [Anderson (1994)].
Although derivative use has generated substantial attention from many
communities, no empirical evidence exists that documents how derivative securities are
actually used by investment managers. This paper analyzes the use of derivatives by
equity mutual funds, by comparing the return characteristics of funds that use derivatives
to those that do not. We study portfolio returns, instead of individual trading in
derivatives, because the ability to trade derivatives is likely to affect managers’ decisions
to trade non-derivatives. Our focus is on three alternative ways derivatives may affect the
distribution of a mutual fund’s returns. First, funds that invest in derivatives may have
higher or lower risk than funds that do not invest in derivatives. Second, managers
investing in derivatives may improve net portfolio performance, either due to lower
transaction costs or because managers better utilize information.
1 Finally, managers may
use derivatives to affect intertemporal changes in the fund’s risk exposure, for example, to
respond to cash flows from investor purchases and redemptions, or to allow fund
managers to game incentive systems.
1 In the absence of transaction costs, derivative securities are typically redundant, since strategies that trade
the underlying securities can duplicate the derivative’s payoff. Holding transaction costs constant,
derivatives may allow a wider range of possible risk profiles. Holding risk constant, derivatives may allow
trading at lower cost. Therefore, we analyze both risk distribution and portfolio performance after
transaction costs.2
The primary contributions of this research are as follows. First, we provide direct
empirical evidence about the use of derivatives by one specific type of investor, equity
mutual funds. Our findings show that most equity mutual funds do not use derivatives.
From our sample of 675 general, domestic equity mutual funds, only 21% invest in
derivative securities. Derivative use is not concentrated in a particular investment
category.
Overall, we find no systematic differences between funds that use derivatives and
those that do not. In contrast to the perception that derivatives increase risk exposure, we
find that equity mutual funds that invest in derivatives have similar risk as funds that do
not use derivatives. Specifically, funds that use derivatives have return distributions that
have similar standard deviations, similar exposure to market risk, and similar skewness
and kurtosis as funds that do not use derivatives. Derivative use is unrelated to net return
performance. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the risk-adjusted returns that accrue to
funds that use derivatives are the same as those that do not invest in derivatives.
Although funds that use and do not use derivatives may, on average, have similar
return distributions, it is possible that derivative users are more heterogeneous.
Specifically, it is possible that some funds that use derivatives have higher standard
deviations due to speculative activity, and others have lower standard deviations as a
result of hedging. Recent publicity may result from a small number of extremely risky
funds. We examine the dispersion of risk measures, and find that this dispersion is
similar for funds that use and do not use derivatives for most of the risk variables
analyzed.
Mutual fund risk exposure is likely to vary with fund performance. Consistent
with prior research, we posit that fund risk should decrease following good performance
and increase after poor performance. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1995) and Chevalier
and Ellison (1995) show that past performance and changes in risk are negatively related,
which they attribute to managerial incentive gaming. We find a similar negative relation,
and hypothesize that this performance-risk relation may be attributable either to managers
who game incentive systems, or to managers who respond slowly to new cash flows.
Although both hypotheses predict a negative relation between past performance and3
change in risk, the role of derivatives differs between the two theories. If managers use
derivatives to manage unexpected cash flows, funds using derivatives will be able to
maintain desired risk exposure more easily. In this case, the relation between past
performance and changes in risk should be weaker for funds using derivatives. On the
other hand, if managers want to game performance systems, derivatives provide a low
cost way to change risk, and thus we expect that funds that use derivatives will have a
stronger relation between performance and risk. We find that changes in risk in response
to prior performance are less severe for derivative users, which is consistent with delayed
managerial response to cash flows, but not with managerial incentive gaming. We also
find that derivative use is related to changes in systematic risk, but not to changes in
idiosyncratic risk, results that suggest the use of market-based derivatives.
Although there is no evidence regarding use of derivatives by investment
managers, two recent papers examine use of derivatives in the commercial banking
industry. Sinkey and Carter (1995) identify firm characteristics associated with
derivative use by commercial banks, and Gorton and Rosen (1995) analyze the risk of
interest rate swap positions for the U.S. commercial banking system as a whole. Geczy,
Minton and Schrand (1995) analyze characteristics of corporations that are associated
with the decision to use derivatives. These papers do not focus primarily on the actual
impact of derivatives, and none of these papers specifically analyzes use of derivatives by
professional investment managers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
current perceptions and theoretical uses of derivatives as an investment for mutual funds.
Section 3 describes the sample. Results concerning risk, performance, and risk
management are contained in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2. Perception and Theory of Derivative Use
Derivative securities have attracted much attention from the press recently. Highly
publicized bankruptcies by Orange County, CA, in December 1994, and the British
investment house of Barings PLC in February 1995, purportedly relating to losses from4
speculative positions in various derivative securities led to a flurry of discussion
questioning investment in derivatives by mutual funds, pension funds, and other
investment agencies. There have been numerous investor lawsuits over losses from
derivatives. Large financial losses by money market funds resulted in much public
concern over investment in derivatives by all mutual funds. There is growing discussion
in Congress and at the Securities and Exchange Commission about whether to regulate
investment in derivatives.
Much of the negative publicity about derivatives in the popular press is in at least
partial contrast to more theoretical arguments in favor of derivatives. Merton (1995)
summarizes the academic position regarding derivative securities, questioning recent
concerns over risks associated with derivatives, because derivatives are just as likely to
reduce risks for financial institutions as increase them. The advantages of derivatives are
well documented. Stoll and Whaley (1985) and Merton (1995) describe the benefits of
options, specifically better risk allocation, reduced information asymmetry and lower
transaction costs. Silber (1985) notes that standardization and centralization of futures
trading improve liquidity so that risk transfer is less expensive and price discovery more
reliable than in cash markets. According to Scholes (1981), improved risk sharing
lowers costs to firms by reducing the probability of bankruptcy; furthermore, derivatives
are a particularly efficient means of taking short positions in assets.
2 Malkiel (1990) and
Silber (1985) discuss the use of derivatives by portfolio managers to manage changing
asset positions temporarily in response to the inflow or outflow of funds.
As an additional consideration, the Investment Company Act of 1940 stipulates
that mutual funds must have asset-to-debt coverage of at least 300%. This requirement
may be a binding constraint for a fund manager who wants to increase risk. Derivatives
provide managers a way to effectively increase leverage without violating the Act.
3. Description of Sample
2 The discussion about bankruptcy is relevant for corporations. We do not expect this argument to be as
important for mutual funds, although it may be a consideration if funds have financial distress costs.5
To construct the sample, we consider all general, domestic equity mutual funds as
classified by Morningstar Mutual Funds OnDisc as of December 31, 1993. Given that
this research involves extensive manual data collection, it is not feasible to include the
entire population of funds covered by Morningstar. We exclude funds that are primarily
bond funds; because of the wide variety and complexity of fixed income derivative
securities, it is difficult to define what constitutes a derivative security for purposes of
this research. Equity funds invest primarily in relatively simpler derivative securities,
particularly options and futures contracts [Schultz (1994)]. We exclude specialty equity
funds and global funds for tractability. The initial sample includes 798 funds classified
by Morningstar as Aggressive Growth, Equity-Income, Growth and Income, Growth or
Small Company Funds.
3
Data for returns on the funds included in the sample come from Morningstar
Mutual Funds OnDisc, January 1995, providing monthly returns data through December
1994. We include returns for the period January 1992 through December 1994.
4
Information on whether the fund invested in derivatives is obtained primarily by
telephone. Appendix A describes the collection of data about derivative use in detail.
The final sample includes 675 funds that meet the following criteria: 1.) included on
Morningstar Mutual Funds OnDisc as of December 31, 1993 and December 31, 1994, in
one of the five equity fund classifications listed above, and 2.) data concerning derivative
use available from telephone interviews, or if interviews were inconclusive, from fund
prospectus or annual report.
We expect the results of the telephone inquiries to be very reliable because there
are potential legal implications for a respondent who denies using derivatives when the
mutual fund actually does invest in derivatives. Given the current public perception
regarding derivatives, we also consider it unlikely that a fund would claim to use
3 Much of the recent negative publicity about mutual funds and derivatives centers on losses due to interest
rate movements for money-market funds. We do not analyze this type of fund.
4 Using returns from a longer time period would improve precision of our variable estimates, but would
also increase the length of time between the date of the returns and the date of our information about
investment in derivatives. This time period was chosen as a compromise between these two considerations.6
derivatives when it does not. However, in order to verify the accuracy of the telephone
interviews, we pursued additional information for all Growth and Income funds that
claimed not to use derivatives. For this subsample of funds, we checked the accuracy of
the telephone interview with the information regarding asset holdings in the fund’s reports
where available. Of 140 such funds, we had prospectus information for 118. Ten of
these funds (8.5%) had options or futures listed as assets in their portfolio holdings, even
though fund representatives denied using derivatives on the phone. Another 84 funds
stated in their prospectus that they were allowed to use derivatives; it is probable that
most of these funds did not invest in derivatives even though the fund charter allowed it.
Table 1 summarizes the number of funds by fund type and use of derivatives. Of
the 675 funds in the total sample, 140, or 20.7%, invest in derivatives. This number
compares to 130 of 726 (17.9%) equity funds responding to a survey by Investment
Company Institute that report using derivatives. The proportion of funds using
derivatives for each fund type ranges from 16.7% of the Small Company funds to 27.3%
of the Aggressive Growth funds, but these differences in the proportions are not
Tables 2 and 3 contain additional descriptive information about the nature of
investments for the 140 funds that report using derivatives. Table 2 summarizes the self-
reported reasons that funds use derivatives. Approximately 46% of funds report using
derivatives primarily for hedging, and only a small number (12 funds, or 8.6%) report
using derivatives only for speculative purposes. Table 3 outlines the types of derivatives
used by these funds. Almost 68% of funds use options and/or futures contracts.
4. Results: Risk
As noted by Merton, Scholes and Gladstein (1978, p. 178) and others, derivatives
“provide a significant expansion of the patterns of portfolio returns available to
investors.” The current public perception described in Section 2 seems to be that
derivatives are highly speculative assets that increase the risk of mutual funds. On the7
other hand, hedging with derivatives may actually reduce fund risk. Bookstaber and
Clarke (1981) discuss another specific change, that options can skew a return distribution
away from the normal distribution. This section analyzes the impact of investment in
derivatives on the higher moments of return distributions, and the next section examines
expected returns.
Our first test examines whether cross-sectional variation in fund risk is related to
use of derivatives. To analyze this issue, we define three different variables to measure
risk:
Standard deviation (STD): the standard deviation of the monthly return for a fund
over the period January 1992-December 1994. Standard deviation is computed as,
Idiosyncratic risk (IDIO): the standard deviation of the residual terms from a
market model regression of fund return in excess of the risk-free rate on a constant and
the CRSP value-weighted return in excess of the risk-free rate.
5 This term is computed
where ei  equals the market model residual.
Beta (BETA): the estimated beta coefficient in a market model regression of fund
return in excess of the risk-free rate on a constant and the CRSP value-weighted return in
excess of the risk-free rate.
We choose these variables to measure total risk (STD), and its decomposition into
idiosyncratic risk (IDIO) and systematic risk (BETA). The SEC is considering requiring
disclosure of either beta or standard deviation as a measure of fund risk.
5 For the regressions to estimate IDIO and BETA, we use the one-month Treasury bill rate from
Datastream as the risk-free rate.8
Given that derivatives may be used to truncate return distributions, for example to
hedge against losses, or to generate income from writing covered call options and
limiting upside gains, we also examine skewness. This statistic will measure symmetry,
or lack thereof, of the return distribution:
Skewness (SKEW): the skewness of the monthly return of a fund, January 1992-
December 1994. Skewness is computed as where
We include kurtosis (KURT) to measure peakedness. If fund return standard deviation
varies from month to month, the distribution of returns will have a higher peak and fatter
tails [for example, Press (1967), and Roll (1988)]. This feature will be reflected in a
higher kurtosis statistic. Stock price returns have been shown to typically have positive
kurtosis, which is described as leptokurtic [Fama (1976)]. Mutual fund managers may
lower kurtosis by using derivatives to hedge against extreme returns, or to smooth month
to month variation in risk.
Kurtosis (KURT): the kurtosis of the monthly return of a fund, January 1992-
December 1994. Kurtosis is computed as
The sample correlations between each variable for the overall sample are reported
in Table 4. Beta and skewness are not significantly correlated, but all other variables are
highly correlated.
The five fund investment categories capture variation in fund risk measures.
Table 5 reports results of tests of differences in mean estimates of the five return
parameters described above across investment objective. We can strongly reject the
hypothesis that funds in different investment objective categories have the same standard9
deviation, idiosyncratic risk, beta, skewness or kurtosis. This conclusion is robust to
either an F-test or the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test.
6
For each type of fund, Table 6 reports the cross-sectional mean values of each
variable for the overall sample, and for subgroups of funds that do and do not invest in
derivatives. Standard deviation and beta are monotonically increasing across the fund
investment objective types, from least to most risky as follows: Equity-Income, Growth
and Income, Growth, Small Company and Aggressive Growth. Unlike the risk measures,
the higher moments (skewness and kurtosis) do not exhibit the same strong pattern.
Figure 1 contains a graphical representation of the results in Table 6.
Comparing funds that invest in derivatives to those that do not, the most notable
result is that there is no significant difference between the two groups for most of the
investment objectives and variables considered. Beta is significantly lower for the
Aggressive Growth funds that use derivatives than for those that do not, indicating that
derivative use is associated with lower systematic risk for funds in this category.
Kurtosis differs significantly between funds that use and do not use derivatives in the
Small Company and Aggressive Growth categories, but there is no systematic tendency
for higher kurtosis to be associated with derivative use.
Results in Table 6 support the hypothesis that there is no difference in return
distributions between funds that do and do not use derivatives. However, similarities in
mean values may obscure greater variation in distributions. Specifically, it is possible
that some funds that use derivatives have higher standard deviations due to speculative
activity, and others have lower standard deviations as a result of hedging. Table 6 reports
only the mean values of the risk variables, which will not reflect variation in the extreme
values. The concerns detailed in the popular press may more accurately reflect concerns
about a few firms with a high degree of risk as a result of derivative investments.
To examine these issues, Table 7 reports data concerning the dispersion of the
distributional parameters summarized in Table 6. This table reports the standard
deviation of each variable (i.e. the standard deviation of the beta or idiosyncratic risk
6 The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric test that is based on each category’s deviation from the
population’s median.10
estimates for the funds in each category), and the 10th and 90th percentiles. Results in
Table 7 show that there is no systematic tendency for funds that use derivatives to have
greater (or less) variation in the risk measures than funds that do not use derivatives. The
90th percentile values of the risk variables (corresponding to the most risky funds) for
funds that use derivatives are neither systematically higher nor lower than for non-users.
An F-test comparing the standard deviation of the variables for funds using derivatives to
those that do not show that there are a few fund types for which specific risk variables are
more widely dispersed for funds using derivatives. However, most of these results are
only marginally significant and are not consistent across fund type or risk measure.
We also investigate the dispersion of non-risk measures, in particular, skewness
and kurtosis. Funds that use derivatives typically have more similar skewness and
kurtosis than funds that do not use derivatives. The exception is Aggressive Growth
funds, for which derivative users have more diverse skewness and kurtosis than non-
users.
Overall, it appears that results concerning mean variable estimates do not obscure
a great deal of variation in the extreme fund values. We conclude that derivative use is
cross-sectionally unrelated to risk exposure and the higher moments of return
distributions.
5. Results: Performance
Results in Section 4 suggest that use of derivatives is not cross-sectionally related to fund
risk, either increased risk due to speculation or decreased risk from hedging. Given that
derivatives do not seem to be associated with the higher moments of the distribution of
fund returns, our second test examines whether derivatives affect mean returns by
allowing trading at lower cost. As noted by The Wall Street Journal [McGee (1995)],
“...[S]tock futures not only boast greater liquidity but also lower transaction costs than
traditional trading methods. Portfolio managers stress that in today’s fast-moving
markets, it’s critical to implement decisions quickly. For giant mutual and pension funds
eager to keep assets fully invested, shifting billions around through stock-index futures is11
much easier than trying to identify individual stocks to buy and sell.” The opportunity to
invest in derivatives may allow a fund manager to implement trades at lower cost, and to
manage inflows and outflows of money to and from the fund more efficiently [Silber
(1985)]. If so, then funds that use derivatives should achieve higher returns (after trading
costs) than those that do not.
7
To analyze this question, we compute a multivariate analog to Jensen’s
where
and       = the mutual fund’s return for month t,
= the risk-free rate at month t,
= the return on the CRSP value-weighted index for month t,
= the difference between the return on the tenth decile (small firm) CRSP
capitalization portfolio and the first decile (large firm) capitalization
portfolio,
= the return on the CRSP long-term corporate bond index (GBTRET)
minus the one-month T-bill yield at month t,
the return difference between the CRSP value-weighted index
with and without dividends in month t-1, and
index return in month t-1.
7 Morningstar’s Operations Manual states that “Momingstar’s calculation of total return is computed each
month by taking the change in monthly net asset value, reinvesting all income and capital-gains
distributions during that month, and dividing by the starting NAV...Morningstar does not adjust the total
returns in this section for sales charges (such as front-end and deferred charges and redemption fees)...The
total returns do account for management, administrative, and 12b-1 fees and other costs automatically
taken out of funds assets.” (p. 116-117).12
This specification controls for three types of risk exposure, market risk, small stock risk,
and interest rate risk. Following Shanken (1990), the beta coefficient on all three types of
risk are modeled as functions of previous performance, dividend yields, and interest rates.
Mutual funds are a natural extension for models that capture risk exposure variation. For
example, a similar specification was utilized by Pontiff (1995) to estimate variation in
closed-end fund risk, and by Ferson and Schadt (1995) to estimate variation in open-end
fund risk. Our decision to incorporate information from dividend yields and interest rates
follows Ferson and Schadt. We incorporate information about performance, since we
expect risk to change based on performance. Section 6 presents a full discussion and
examination of this topic.
We use ordinary least squares to estimate this model with the following equation:
Table 8 contains these results.
8 For three of the five fund types the alphas for funds using
derivatives are greater than those for funds that do not use derivatives. These differences
are generally neither statistically nor economically significant. Results show that there is
no significant difference in performance as measured by alpha between the funds that use
derivatives and those that do not.
6. Results: Risk Management
8 Bookstaber and Clarke (1984, 1985) argue that investment in options skews the distribution of portfolio
returns so that traditional mean-variance analyses are not appropriate. Results in Table 6 suggest that the
skewness of funds that use derivatives does not differ significantly from those that do not. Therefore,
funds in this sample that use derivatives do not appear to use options extensively enough to alter skewness,
and we proceed with this mean-variance analysis.13
Mutual fund risk may vary with fund performance during the year for at least two
reasons, both of which predict that risk should decrease after good performance, and
increase after poor performance. First, fund managers may respond slowly to cash
inflows and outflows. Ippolito (1992) shows that cash flows are related to fund
performance; specifically, money flows into funds that perform well and out of funds
that perform poorly. A similar finding is documented using aggregate data by Warther
(1995). Managers may be reluctant to invest or divest securities immediately in response
to unexpected cash flows, perhaps because unexpected cash flows do not necessarily
correspond with managers’ information about optimal trading. This view is supported by
Edelen (1995), who shows that mutual fund trades that are related to unexpected cash
flows are less profitable than trades that are not influenced by cash flows. Managerial
reluctance to invest new cash immediately causes the fund’s cash position to increase
after periods of good performance, which leads to a decrease in fund risk. Likewise, after
poor performance investors will redeem shares, and fund risk will increase if managers
borrow to meet redemptions.
Second, mutual fund managers may alter fund risk to game incentive
compensation plans. Investment manager compensation contracts have asymmetric pay-
for-performance relations that resemble call options. These contracts provide incentives
for a manager to increase risk, especially after periods of poor performance. One type of
contract awards bonuses for outperforming a benchmark. Other, simpler contracts pay
the manager a flat percentage of fund assets. This structure still leads to a call-option-like
payoff since the amount of new cash that flows into a well-performing fund is greater
than the amount of cash that is redeemed from a poor performer [for example, Ippolito
(1992), Sirri and Tufano (1993), and Chevalier and Ellison (1995)].
Managers incur some costs from increasing fund risk. If managers are risk averse,
then increasing fund risk also increases compensation risk. Also, some incentive
contracts specify a maximum payment to the manager, which implies a cost for
increasing risk. The manager’s choice of risk exposure will depend on the relative costs
and benefits. The net benefits of increasing risk will be greater after poor performance.14
Thus, managers should increase risk after poor performance, and decrease risk after good
performance [for a formal treatment, see Grinblatt and Titman (1989)].
Both the slow manager response conjecture and the incentive gaming conjecture
predict that risk will increase after periods of poor performance and decrease after periods
of good performance. The use of derivatives is likely to vary, depending on which
conjecture is more accurate. For example, if managers have an information disadvantage
when forced to trade individual securities for fund flow management, futures contracts
will allow them to respond to cash flows and maintain desired risk exposure without
trading individual securities. This conjecture predicts that funds that use derivatives will
have a weaker performance/risk relation than funds that do not use derivatives. If
managers game performance systems by increasing risk after poor performance and
decreasing risk after good performance, derivatives will provide a lower cost way to
change risk, and thus we expect that funds that use derivatives will have a stronger
relation between performance and risk.
Two studies document a relation between past performance and changes in risk:
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1995) and Chevalier and Ellison (1995). Both studies
conclude that past performance and changes in risk are negatively related, which they
attribute to managerial incentive gaming. Chevalier and Ellison (1995) mention that
managers may use derivatives to manage risk, but the authors provide few direct
empirical results regarding derivatives. Neither Brown et al. nor Chevalier and Ellison
consider the impact of delayed managerial response to cash flows.
To test the relation between prior fund performance and use of derivatives to alter
fund risk characteristics, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression
the first six months and the second six months of the year, D is a dummy variable equal15
to 1 if the fund invests in derivatives, and PERF is the difference between the mean
excess return on the fund and the mean excess return for funds with the same investment
objective over a comparable period.
9 LagRISK is the value of the risk variable during the
From this regression we can infer the performance-risk relation for funds that do
we can infer the incremental effect
that derivative holdings have on this relation. Lagged risk is included in our
specification, since we expect that this variable will capture variation in risk changes that
is caused by mismeasurement. Our risk measures are summary statistics, and are
measured with error. In periods in which measured risk is high, we expect lower risk
next period, due to mean reversion in the noise component of our estimate.
Ferson and Schadt (1995) provide evidence that funds in similar objective
categories exhibit risk that is related to economy-wide factors. In order to control for
changes in risk that are related to an entire group of funds, we include dummy variables
for year and fund type.
Table 9 reports the regression estimates using weighted least squares. The
weights are computed by running a first-pass ordinary least squares regression. The
residual terms from this regression are used to compute a fund-specific standard
deviation. The inverse of this term is used as the weight in the second-pass weighted
least squares regression.
For all three risk measures- STD, IDIO, and BETA- the slope coefficients on past
performance are negative and statistically significant. This result is similar to the
findings of Brown et al. (1995) and Chevalier and Ellison (1995). Overall, this finding
lends support to both the incentive gaming conjecture and the slow managerial response
conjecture.
9 Our decision to use a peer group benchmark is influenced by Farnsworth et al., (1995), who show that
peer group benchmarks are very informative about future returns. Performance was also estimated using
the CRSP value-weighted index as a benchmark. This specification had no material impact on any of the
results.16
The coefficient on the interaction between derivatives and performance is positive
for all three risk parameters, and significant for standard deviation and beta. Thus, the
relation between previous performance and change in risk is less severe for funds that use
derivatives. These findings support the slow managerial response conjecture and
contradict the incentive gaming conjecture. For the idiosyncratic risk regression, the
slope coefficient on the interaction variable is insignificant. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that derivatives use is unrelated to changes in non-market risk. This evidence
supports the notion that mutual fund managers manage risk with market-based derivatives
such as options and futures on the S&P 500 Index.
7. Conclusions
This paper provides evidence about the ways in which mutual fund managers use
derivatives. 21% of the equity mutual funds analyzed in this paper use derivatives,
mainly options and futures and primarily for hedging. We find no systematic differences
in various risk measures and the higher moments of return distributions between funds
that do and do not use derivatives. This finding contradicts the popular association of
derivative use with increased risk exposure. We also find that funds that use derivatives
do not perform significantly better or worse than those that do not.
Finally, previous research suggests that mutual fund risk should decrease after
good performance and increase after poor performance. We find evidence that change in
fund risk is negatively related to past performance, but that derivatives allow funds to
dampen these changes. Derivative use is significantly related to changes in systematic
risk, but not to changes in idiosyncratic risk, suggesting use of stock index derivatives.
We interpret these results as consistent with the hypothesis that managers are slow to
respond to inflows and outflows of funds, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that
managers game incentive compensation systems.17
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Appendix A:
Collection of Information About Use of Derivatives
“Fund-tracking services such as Morningstar Inc. and Lipper Analytical Services Inc.
generally find it difficult to compile lists of funds that are active users of derivatives. That’s
because of the inconsistency of disclosure and the fact that certain bonds--such as kitchen-
sink bonds or structured notes--don’t lend themselves to easy identification... Michael
Lipper, president of Lipper, laments that funds can buy and sell a derivative security
between financial-statement dates, leaving no trace...So what’s a shareholder to do? [One]
suggestion is to call the fund companies and ask if they use derivatives, and if so, how and
why they use them. A fund prospectus often can state that the fund manager has the
authority to invest in complex derivatives. But, in fact, the manager may act only rarely on
that authority.” [Schultz (1994)]
During the period December 1994 through June 1995, we attempted to contact 798 funds
classified as Aggressive Growth, Equity-Income, Growth and Income, Growth or Small
Company Funds by Morningstar Mutual Funds OnDisc. We called each fund at the
telephone number listed in the Operations Information section of the Morningstar
database. Each successful telephone interview gathered responses to the following
questions:
1.) Has Fund invested in derivatives in the last couple of years?
1 a.) For example, has Fund invested in options or futures in the last couple of
years?
2.) If so, what types of derivatives (options, futures or other derivatives)?
3.) What does the fund use derivatives for?
Question (1) was designed to identify funds that use derivatives, and Question (1a) to
verify the response. Questions (2) and (3) were designed to collect additional information
about the use of derivatives. Also, each fund was asked to mail a copy of the fund
prospectus and annual report to us.
The telephone respondents demonstrated a wide variety of knowledge about the
funds themselves and finance in general. Some fund representatives had no idea what
derivatives were, despite repeated explanations on our part. At least one fund manager21
delivered a hostile lecture about how derivatives were not evil securities. Each time we
had doubts about the knowledge of the respondent or the accuracy of the response, we
asked to speak to the fund manager or someone more knowledgeable. Also, all
questionable responses were verified by another phone call and/or review of the
prospectus.
From the telephone calls, we obtained information about derivative use for 663 of
the 798 funds. We were missing information from the funds for the following general
reasons: the telephone number was disconnected or there was no response after repeated
attempts, the fund had merged, liquidated or was otherwise closed to new investors, or
the person responding to the call did not know the answer and was unable to provide the
name of someone who did. For the 135 funds missing information after the telephone
calls, we reviewed the prospectus (if available) to attempt to classify derivative use. We
reviewed both the investment objective description and the balance sheet data. The
investment objective indicated whether the fund was allowed to invest in derivatives, and
the balance sheet indicated derivative positions as of a particular date. Over half of the
funds reviewed are allowed to invest in derivatives, but many do not actually do so.
Therefore, we considered only those funds with positive positions listed on their balance
sheets as investing in derivatives. We obtained information for 42 additional funds from
the prospectus, for a sample of 705 funds. We lost an additional 30 funds when we
extended the sample period through December 1994, for a final sample of 675 funds.Table 1:
Summary of Sample Funds’ Investment in Derivatives
Sample of 675 equity mutual funds from Morningstar. Derivative use is self-
reported during telephone interviews. Numbers in parentheses represent the
percentage of funds for a given Investment Objective.